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Executive summary
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an international trade and development 
strategy. Launched in 2013, it is one of the ways China asserts its role in world affairs and cap-
tures the opportunities of globalisation. The BRI has the potential to enhance development 
prospects across the world and in China, but that potential might not be realised because the 
BRI’s objectives are too broad and ill-defined, and its execution is too often non-transparent, 
lacking in due diligence and uncoordinated. 
This Policy Contribution recounts the background of the BRI and its context, what is 
known about the extent of the initiative and the intentions behind it. The initiative could ad-
dress very large infrastructure investments gaps, which is welcome and needed. China’s goal 
of forging stronger links with its trading partners around the world is legitimate assuming, of 
course, the underlying intent remains peaceful.
Though many observers welcome the BRI, many others oppose it for good reasons, while 
others misunderstand it and oppose it for bad reasons. We identify and discuss concerns 
about the initiative that relate to its geopolitical objectives, its priorities, its geographic scope, 
the role of state-owned enterprises, the allocation of resources and issues of transparency and 
of due diligence. In particular, we show that this initiative deals with a vast number of coun-
tries that are at very different states of development, and that an apparent lack of well-de-
fined priorities holds the initiative back. We also highlight the issue of debt overload which is 
distressing several BRI countries and discourages further projects.
There are improvements that China and other stakeholders in the BRI could make to get 
the most from their investments. The BRI, to be effective, needs to meet the basic conditions 
of a trade and development strategy, which are clear objectives, adequate resources, selectiv-
ity, a workable implementation plan, due diligence and clear communication. Involvement 
of multilateral lenders could help with this. Finally, China must improve the evaluation of the 
risks and costs of BRI projects and step up its approach to due diligence to demonstrate that 
it respects the long-term interests of those countries that are at the receiving end of its BRI 
projects.
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Introduction
Over the last four decades world trade, spurred by advances in information, transportation 
and communication technologies, as well as liberalisation policies, has come to play a cen-
tral role in countries’ development strategies. A far greater share than before of the world’s 
GDP is traded, China is the biggest trading nation and developing countries as a group now 
account for more than 40 percent of world trade. Meanwhile, in 2016 just one quarter of 
world merchandise trade took the form of consumer products (UNCTAD, 2018). Trade in 
primary commodities, parts and components, and capital goods accounted for three quarters 
of world trade, feeding complex international production networks – so-called global value 
chains. These networks are organised around three regional hubs: China, the European Union 
(centred on Germany) and the United States (World Bank, 2017). Participation in global value 
chains allows poor and rich countries to exploit comparative advantage in a more articulated 
way, while consumers benefit from lower prices and increased variety.
To capture these opportunities, and to consolidate friendships and enhance security, 
policymakers in China, the EU and the US have promoted economic integration in their 
regions (‘the near abroad’). Each has taken a different path, reflecting their priorities and his-
tories. The most ambitious of these endeavours has been the progressive enlargement of the 
European Community from six original members to a European Union of 28 countries, which 
have put into practice the four freedoms, namely the movement of goods, services, capital 
and people, across their territory. The EU has also forged Economic Partnership Agreements, 
which include a mix of aid, trade and policy coordination, with several dozen countries in 
its near-neighbourhood in eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Less comprehensive in scope and more tightly focused on international trade is 
the network of Free Trade Agreements orchestrated by the United States and encompassing 
nearly all countries in North, Central and South America, with Argentina and Brazil notable 
exceptions. Meanwhile, to widen their circle of friends and to strengthen their position in 
global value chains in sectors such as automobiles, electronics and food processing, the US 
and EU have increasingly reached beyond their immediate regions, striking trade and invest-
ment deals with countries on the other side of the world. 
What is the BRI, exactly?
While the EU and US have reached out to partners in their different ways, Chinese economic 
diplomacy has not been passive; in fact, reflecting China’s comparatively recent opening 40 
years ago, the contrary is true. Even before the BRI was launched in 2013, China had conclud-
ed some twenty trade agreements, started negotiations on a regional trade agreement with 15 
other Asian nations1, concluded about 100 bilateral investment treaties, established a signifi-
cant foreign aid and cultural exchange programme, launched two international development 
banks and become a major investor in natural resources across the developing world. China 
joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001 after protracted negotiations and has played 
an increasingly active role in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in recent 
years. After many years of lobbying, the Chinese renminbi was included in 2016 as one of five 
currencies forming the Special Drawing Right2.
1 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) includes: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and 
Vietnam.
2 See https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Special-Drawing-Right-SDR.
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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was the latecomer in China’s extensive set of interna-
tional economic initiatives, but might well turn out to be the most ambitious. Just five years 
after its launch, the BRI has become the organising framework for China’s economic relations 
with about half of the world’s nations of any size.  
The earliest mention of the BRI was in a speech given by Chinese president Xi Jinping in 
Astana, Kazakhstan, on 7 September 2013 (Xi, 2013). The framework he set out has featured 
consistently in his speeches since and has served as the foundation for the 100 or so Mem-
orandums of Understanding (MoU) between China and other BRI participating nations. 
Recalling the Silk Road of ancient times, a trade route which linked China to Europe through 
Central and South Asia, Xi proposed a five point plan:
1. Policy consultation on joint development strategies and regional integration among all 
countries along the Silk Road;
2. Improved road connections and transport infrastructure that would facilitate creation of 
an economic belt (hence the name ‘belt and road’);
3. Reduced barriers to trade and investment;
4. ‘Monetary circulation’, including currency convertibility for trade and investment 
purposes and acceptance of each other’s currencies, implying an increased role for the 
renminbi;
5. Increased exchanges among people (students, tourists, researchers, professionals in vari-
ous fields) to share knowledge and promote understanding.
Xi also set out a basic principle of the BRI, a familiar refrain of Chinese foreign policy that 
is important for understanding the way the BRI functions: “We respect the development path 
and domestic and foreign policies pursued independently by every country…. we will never 
interfere in internal affairs”. The signal here is that the BRI is essentially a business proposition 
and it does not carry with it a dose of ‘extraneous’ conditions, such as those relating to macro-
economic imbalances or governance, and nor does it imply the creation of an alliance.
The fundamental motives of the BRI are like those of US and EU international economic 
diplomacy, namely to consolidate friendships and to capture commercial opportunities. 
However, the BRI is different in both design and execution, reflecting China’s development 
path and the global outlook of its leaders. 
• First, under the BRI umbrella, China emphasises investment in infrastructure and in 
trade facilitation (‘connectivity’) more than it does, for example, elimination of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. A government white paper (NDRC, 2015) on the BRI states: “…
with regard to transport infrastructure construction, we should focus on the key passage-
ways, junctions and projects… We should build a unified coordination mechanism for 
whole-course transportation, increase connectivity of customs clearance… We should push 
forward port infrastructure construction… We should expand and build platforms and 
mechanisms for comprehensive civil aviation cooperation…”. Projects that form part of the 
BRI – some of which preceded the initiative and have been subsumed under it – tend to 
be very large. They include, for example, a $3.19 billion high-speed railway connection 
between Jakarta and Bandung in Indonesia, a $3.14 billion railway link between Dhaka 
and Jessore in Bangladesh3, and a railway line between Serbia’s capital Belgrade to Hunga-
ry’s capital Budapest for $3 billion4. The BRI goes beyond transport to include energy and 
industrial facilities, such as the construction of several nuclear reactors in Pakistan for 
more than $6.5 billion, hydropower projects in Pakistan totalling $5.7 billion, a $2.2 billion 
 
 
3 Data from the China Global Investment Tracker published by the American Enterprise Institute.
4 Ibid.
The fundamental 
motives of the BRI 
are like those of US 
and EU international 
economic diplomacy: 
to consolidate 
friendships and to 
capture commercial 
opportunities
4 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚1 | January 2019
investment by State Grid Corporation of China in Brazilian energy infrastructure and a $2 
billion industrial park in a special economic zone in Kenya. In emphasising infrastruc-
ture, China creates an outlet for its know-how and capacities in building and operating 
transport and energy facilities – ie roads, bridges, railways, ports, airports, power stations 
and electricity grids. According to the OECD steel committee, between 2006 and 2015, 
Chinese steel-making capacity more than doubled and now represents almost half of 
global steel-making capacity, yet global capacity utilisation in the steel industry declined 
from about 80 percent to 70 percent. To a limited extent, BRI infrastructure projects help 
mitigate the problems arising from these excess capacities.
• Second, the BRI explicitly aims to strengthen connections between China’s poor and 
remote western regions and nations to the west, south and north of these regions, and 
with China’s flourishing coastal agglomerations. Per-capita gross product in the western 
provinces of Qinghai and Xinjiang are about a third of gross product per capita in Beijing 
and Shanghai (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018) and reducing this gap by inte-
grating these regions into global markets is a major goal of Chinese policy.   
• Third, China’s state-owned enterprises, such as Sinopec Group, China Communications 
Construction Group, China National Petroleum Company, State Grid Corporation of 
China, Power Construction Group of China and China Railway Construction Corporation, 
rather than its private sector, dominate the deals struck under the BRI and their imple-
mentation. They are often of a turn-key variety, ie not necessarily requiring much by way 
of competitive external procurement. State-owned banks, such as the Industrial and Com-
mercial Bank of China and China Construction Bank, are the main source of finance for 
these projects. These SOEs might not always operate at the frontier of efficiency, and some 
have only limited experience of operating outside China, but they have the size, access to 
finance, access to low cost labour and engineering and risk-taking capacity to embark on 
infrastructure projects with a long-term horizon in difficult environments. These state-
owned firms are primarily profit-driven, and they typically offer finance at commercial 
rates. However, when the need arises, they can also be guided by their political masters to 
include in their assessments of projects not just intrinsic profitability but broader national 
objectives, such as increasing trade, improving access to raw materials and sustaining 
employment. 
• Fourth, with the rate of return to domestic investment declining, China needs overseas 
outlets for its very large domestic savings. In the five years to 2007, China’s economy grew 
on average in excess of 10 percent a year, while in the five years to 2017, it grew at a rate 
of between 6.5 percent to 7 percent. This large deceleration was not accompanied by a 
decline in the domestic investment rate, but by an increase from around 41 percent of 
GDP to around 45 percent of GDP, implying a sharp decline in the efficiency of domestic 
investment. 
• Fifth, unlike nearly all other large providers of bilateral and multilateral development 
finance, China’s investments under the BRI come with few safeguards such as those relat-
ed to environment, consultation of civil society and fiscal sustainability. Consistent with 
China’s policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, even fewer conditions are attached 
to the BRI related to issues such as human rights, democracy and governance.  
It is important to note that, while the BRI, differently from the EU and the US, emphasises 
infrastructure rather than trade agreements, that does not mean that trade agreements are 
neglected. In recent years, a considerable effort has been devoted to establishing a global net-
work of agreements which are clearly intended to be complementary and synergistic with the 
BRI. In Table 1, the countries in shaded rows are those listed as BRI participating countries by 
the China International Trade Institute. Of the 44 countries listed as either having or envisag-
ing trade agreements with China, 29 are BRI participants. Of these, 16 have a trade agreement 
with China in force, nearly all of which were concluded or were under negotiation before the 
BRI was launched in 2013. However, of these 16 BRI countries with a trade agreement, 14 are 
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negotiating a revised and presumably deeper trade agreement. Another group of BRI coun-
tries, 10 in number, do not have trade agreements with China and are negotiating them. In yet 
another group of BRI countries, 3 in number, trade agreements are under consideration.
Table 1: China’s trade agreements (shaded rows = BRI countries)
Partner country
China’s 
exports in $ 
billions (rank)
China’s 









Hong Kong, China 287.3 (2) 16.7 (24) ü
Japan 129.3 (3) 145.7 (2) ü
Korea, Rep. 93.7 (4) 159 (1) ü ü
Vietnam 61.1 (6) 37.2 (12) ü ü  
India 58.4 (7) 11.8 (28) ü ü  
Singapore 44.5 (10) 26 (14) ü ü  
Malaysia 37.7 (12) 49.3 (8) ü ü  
Australia 37.3 (14) 70.9 (7) ü ü
Thailand 37.2 (15) 38.5 (11) ü ü  
Indonesia 32.1 (17) 21.4 (18) ü ü  
United Arab Emirates 30.1 (18) 10 (31)   ü  
Philippines 29.8 (19) 17.4 (22) ü ü  
Canada 27.3 (20) 18.3 (21) ü
Saudi Arabia 18.7 (25) 23.6 (15)   ü  
Pakistan 17.2 (26) 1.9 (64) ü ü  
Bangladesh 14.3 (31) 0.9 (75) ü    
Chile 12.8 (33) 18.6 (20) ü
Myanmar 8.2 (37) 4.1 (46) ü ü  
Israel 8.2 (38) 3.2 (52)   ü  
Colombia 6.8 (43) 2.5 (55) ü
Panama 6.3 (44) 0 (144)   ü  
Peru 6 (46) 9.5 (33) ü ü
New Zealand 4.8 (51) 7.1 (34) ü ü  
Sri Lanka 4.3 (53) 0.3 (103) ü ü  
Cambodia 3.9 (58) 0.8 (76) ü ü  
Switzerland 3.2 (62) 39.9 (10) ü ü
Macao 3.1 (63) 0.1 (117) ü
Kuwait 3 (65) 6.4 (36)   ü  
Norway 2.6 (71) 3.2 (51) ü
Oman 2.1 (78) 12 (27)   ü  
Qatar 1.5 (95) 4 (47)   ü  
Costa Rica 1.5 (96) 0.7 (79) ü
Mongolia 1 (110) 3.6 (48)     ü
Laos 1 (111) 1.4 (71) ü ü  
Nepal 0.9 (116) 0 (155)     ü
Bahrain 0.8 (118) 0.1 (134)   ü  
Mauritius 0.8 (120) 0 (158) ü
Georgia 0.7 (121) 0.1 (137) ü    
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Papua New Guinea 0.6 (124) 1.6 (65)     ü
Brunei 0.5 (127) 0.2 (105) ü ü  
Fiji 0.4 (137) 0 (163) ü
Iceland 0.1 (157) 0.1 (131) ü
Moldova 0.1 (168) 0 (154)   ü  
Occ. Palestian Terr. 0.1 (175) 0 (183)   ü  
Source: Bruegel based on WITS database, China Ministry of Commerce and China International Trade Institute. Note: The blue-shaded 
countries are those listed as the 65 participating countries in the BRI by the China International Trade Institute. Trade volumes and country 
ranks are for 2016. 
The effect of the trade agreements with the 29 BRI countries in Table 1 is significant. 
China’s combined trade with the BRI countries in Table 1 is greater than that with Japan and 
South Korea combined. Since China already faces low Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) applied 
tariff rates (0-3 percent on average, trade-weighted) in its two main export markets, namely 
the US and the EU, Beijing has achieved or through the BRI is on the way to achieving, largely 
unimpeded access to world markets5. 
Related to trade and to the objective of improving understanding among nations, the BRI 
also places considerable emphasis on the temporary movement of people. China is already 
the largest source of students and tourists abroad, mainly in the direction of Western nations. 
In 2017 there were 847,000 Chinese students abroad6, of whom more than 430,000 were in the 
US7, UK8 and Australia9. However, Chinese students and tourists also represent a large propor-
tion of visitors to BRI countries. And in 2016, China hosted more than 200,000 students10 and 
2 million visitors from BRI countries (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). 
A gap in the market
Parties to the BRI have reason, on security and geopolitical grounds, to befriend China, or at 
least not to alienate it. Home to 1.3 billion people, and already the world’s largest economy 
by some measures, it is both a source of fear and attraction. On narrow commercial grounds 
alone, China’s offer to participate in the BRI is one that many countries can’t refuse. 
To start with, China’s rise as an importer acts as a powerful incentive to join the BRI. 
China’s imports of goods and services in 2017 amounted to $2,208 billion, third in rank after 
the US and the EU (intra-EU imports excluded). Since 2007 these imports have grown at 
an annual rate of 8.8 percent compared to 3.9 percent in the US and 3.2 percent in the EU 
(intra-EU imports excluded). Over the same period, China’s economy is less reliant on exports 
as its exports as a percentage of GDP have declined from 35 percent to 20 percent, and its cur-
rent account surplus in percent of GDP has declined from 9.9 percent to 1.4 percent (World 
Bank, 2018a). China is no longer perceived as just a source of cheap imports. It is now the 
5 By contrast, China’s largest trading partners face high MFN applied tariffs in China. For example, the EU faces 8.2 
percent tariffs on its non-agricultural products exported to China on average (trade-weighted), and the United 
States 6.5 percent (WTO et al, 2018). China has recently announced unilateral MFN tariff reductions across a wide 
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largest export market for 20 countries11, including large and medium-sized economies such 
as Brazil, Indonesia, Australia and South Korea, and 48 countries ran a merchandise trade 
surplus with China in 2016. The Chinese trade balance reflects its role as a manufacturer and 
assembler in global value chains – China runs a trade deficit on primary products and a trade 
surplus on manufactured goods. Countries that run a trade surplus with China are those that 
supply raw materials (especially oil but also agricultural commodities, metals and rubber), 
those that supply components for electronics, such as integrated circuits or LCDs, especially 
the Asian newly-industrialised economies, and those that supply high-end machinery and 
consumer goods, eg Switzerland. China holds an especially strong hand in negotiating with 
these countries. Countries that run the largest trade deficit with China are those that have the 
largest consumer markets: the United States, the European Union and India. They are among 
the most openly sceptical of the BRI.
Second, China has become a large foreign investor and finance provider. Since 2007, Chi-
na’s outward FDI flows increased from $27 billion to $125 billion, ranking fourth in the world, 
after the US, EU and Japan (UNCTAD, 2018). China has also rapidly become a large foreign 
creditor, as its external assets have increased from $2,416 billion in 2007 to $6,926 billion in 
2017, the 8th rank in the world (IMF, 2018). Although it is difficult to compile precise data, 
partial statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence suggests China is now the largest foreign 
investor in many developing countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, 
Jayaram et al (2017) estimate that, in addition to being Africa’s largest trading partner by a 
factor of three, China is now the first provider of infrastructure financing, third provider of aid, 
and owns the fourth largest stock of FDI in Africa despite being a latecomer. 
Third, insofar as the BRI is seen as an infrastructure arrangement, it fills a large unmet 
need. The Global Infrastructure Outlook (Global Infrastructure Hub, 2017) finds that over 
half of global infrastructure investment needs in the next decades are going to arise in Asia, 
where $21 trillion is needed in the period up to 203012. Comparing these needs with current 
investment trends, the Outlook identifies an investment gap in Asia of $3.3 trillion up to 2030, 
with $1.4 trillion missing for telecommunication projects, $0.9 trillion missing for energy pro-
jects and $0.5 trillion missing in each case for transportation and water projects. Taking these 
numbers at face value, in Asia alone there is an annual infrastructure investment gap of $275 
billion. To put this number into perspective, it compares with $18.5 billion in total lending by 
the World Bank Group (World Bank, 2018b)13 to South Asia, East Asia and Pacific and Europe 
and Central Asia, and to $29 billion of combined operations by the Asian Development Bank14 
in 2017. Infrastructure investment needs on the African continent and in the Americas are 
smaller but the investment gaps are still significant, amounting to $2 trillion and $3 trillion, 
respectively (Global Infrastructure Hub, 2017).
The need for infrastructure in developing countries is unmet for many reasons, the most 
important of which is the high-risk and uncertain return associated with long-term invest-
ment in environments with weak governance, volatile macroeconomic and political condi-
tions, and fragile public finances. Compounding these deterrents to infrastructure invest-
ment, foreign creditors, beginning with the multilateral development banks, have been led by 
a combination of unhappy experience and the pressure of civil society to adhere to extensive 
conditions. These come in four main types: a) safeguards relating to sustainability, impact on 
the environment and on communities; b) conditions relating to governance and macroeco-
nomic stability; c) conditions relating to the financial sustainability of the project; d) proce-
11 Based on WITS (2018) trade indicators. This number is likely to be higher in reality as many oil exporting econ-
omies which export to China (Saudi Arabia, Iran, United Arab Emirates) do not report their exports to China. 
Furthermore, data is only for Mainland China and a significant share of exports reported to Hong Kong are likely to 
be directed to China.
12 A similar study by the Asian Development Bank (2017) projected infrastructure investment needs in Asia to sum to 
$26 trillion between 2016 and 2030.
13 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report/fiscal-year-data.
14 See https://www.adb.org/news/adb-2017-operations-reach-289-billion.
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dures relating to procurement, such as open competitive bidding. A pervasive concern about 
corrupt decision-making underpins the adoption of several of these safeguards. While many 
of these precautions are clearly necessary, their cumulative effect can result in extremely long 
project design, approval and execution times. For example, the average duration of all World 
Bank projects (not just infrastructure), from board approval to conclusion is 5.6 years15. How-
ever, this estimate does not include project preparation and, for infrastructure, the complete 
project cycle might take twice as long. To communities with urgent needs for water, roads or 
electricity (not to mention to politicians who want to respond to these needs within an elec-
tion cycle) the attraction of proposals that can cut through many of these impediments, can 
be approved quickly and that are turn-key, thus avoiding complicated procurement rules and 
coordination between multiple providers, is obvious. 
Fourth, initial participation in the BRI requires only the signing of a brief four or five 
page confidential memorandum of understanding, which commits the country to very little 
beyond agreeing to work with China in line with Xi’s framework to identify specific infrastruc-
ture projects that might or might not materialise16. In short, the BRI appears to bring with 
it significant opportunity while not asking for much other than for giving consideration to 
specific projects or deals that improve the ‘connectivity’ to China. The devil is in the details 
of the projects that follow, which typically require government guarantees and the pledge of 
collateral. 
It is thus not surprising that many countries near and far from China’s neighbourhood 
have expressed a strong interest in the BRI, and that the Chinese have responded. Since its 
formulation as a proposal to nations in Central Asia, the BRI offer has been extended to South 
East and South Asia (The ‘Maritime Silk Road’ sailing south from China along the Indian coast 
onto the coast of Eastern Africa and onto Europe), and then to eastern and southern Europe, 
Russia, the Arab countries, East Africa and, most recently, Latin America. In a short time, the 
BRI has become the touchstone of China’s bilateral economic diplomacy and central to its 
foreign policy. It is Xi’s signature initiative and China’s Communist Party formally adopted the 
BRI under its Party Constitution at the National Party Congress in 2017.
An early assessment
The BRI is a young initiative. But, after five years, enough information exists to provide an 
initial assessment of the strategy. As more data becomes available on the performance of BRI 
projects, it will be possible to produce a more rigorous evaluation of its progress. 
The BRI responds to the unfilled need for investment in infrastructure across the develop-
ing world and offers improved access to the world’s fastest growing large market. As such, it 
should be viewed benignly, but it is not. Many observers view the BRI with suspicion. Official 
donors in Japan, the European Union and the United States have been especially active in 
voicing concerns. In this section we identify both those concerns that we believe reflect mis-
understandings or that are, to a lesser or greater degree, exaggerated, and – crucially – those 
that reflect the BRI’s genuine shortcomings.
Geopolitics   
Many critics claim that the BRI is not really a trade or development initiative but a drive to 
extend China’s influence. This charge is part true but is also disingenuous. From the Marshall 
Plan to the European Coal and Steel Community and to the (ill-fated) Trans-Pacific Partner-
15 Authors’ calculations using data from http://projects.worldbank.org/.
16 One such memorandum, between China and the government of Victoria, a province of Australia, was recently 
made public at the insistence of opposition parties and the Australian Federal Government; see https://www.abc.
net.au/news/2018-11-12/victoria-china-belt-and-road-infrastructure-agreement-released/10487034.
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ship, initiatives such as the BRI have been motivated by geopolitical and security considera-
tions as much as by economics. 
Undoubtedly, China’s heft and the rapidity of its rise present a unique challenge to the 
established powers. It does not help that the BRI is gaining traction at a time when the United 
States and the European Union are on the defensive. The US Administration has embraced 
protectionism. The EU is reeling from Brexit and from the advance of national populism 
across the continent. To assuage worries about its growing weight, China’s leaders never tire 
of declaring that they have no ambition to dominate or to replace the United States in its 
global leadership role. But should China be believed?
At the core of the debate over China’s influence are vastly different perceptions about 
what China is trying to do. For example, Yan Xuetong, a prominent Chinese political scientist 
wrote that China believes countries should follow their own paths: “[China] views national 
sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle 
on which the international order should rest” (Yan, 2019). In contrast, Jim Mattis, the former 
United States Secretary of Defence, widely considered a moderate, stated in his letter of resig-
nation to President Donald Trump that it was “clear that China and Russia, for example, want 
to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over other 
nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions – to promote their own interests at the 
expense of their neighbours, America and our allies”17. 
To these political debates must be added the hand-wringing over China’s Made in China 
2025 plan18, which sets leadership in high-tech industries as an objective, in direct com-
petition with Germany, Japan, the United States and the other advanced economies – and 
with a hefty dose of state support to boot. Although the two dozen or so high-tech firms with 
the highest stock market capitalisation are still predominantly American, Chinese firms in 
the digital and other sectors are quickly catching up in terms of research and development 
expenditure and are increasingly replacing European and US incumbent firms in leading 
R&D positions (Veugelers, 2018).
Valid as these geopolitical and macroeconomic concerns might turn out to be – a matter 
on which we choose not to deliberate here – it is important to judge the BRI on its merits as a 
trade and development initiative. 
Objectives and priorities
The world is by now familiar with the EU’s and the US’s trade agreements. Stakeholders might 
accept or object to specific provisions in the US and EU agreements, or they might accept or 
reject them outright, but they know quite precisely what they are dealing with. Similarly, the 
World Bank’s approach to lending and the conditions associated with it are clearly spelled 
out, as, typically, are the Bank’s priorities in engaging with specific countries. In contrast, the 
BRI’s objectives as stated, for example, in Xi’s Astana speech and as subsequently applied in 
practice, are extremely broad and its modalities are undefined. 
For some observers, this passes as pragmatism (‘The Chinese Way’), but in reality, it 
reflects China’s difficulty in coordinating such a vast overseas enterprise. As a result, many 
inside and outside China are confused about the scope of the BRI. Thus, international observ-
ers such as the World Bank, the Center for Global Development and the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, describe the BRI differently as “an ambitious effort to improve 
regional cooperation and connectivity on a trans-continental scale” or as a “vast investment 
scheme”, or as “an infrastructure financing initiative for a large part of the global economy”. 
In its 2015 white paper (NDRC, 2015), the Chinese government described the BRI as aiming 
to create a single market, ie as “promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly 
efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets”. 
The lack of clarity has political consequences since those who oppose the BRI can define it 
17 See, for example, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/20/politics/james-mattis-resignation-letter-doc/index.html.
18 See http://english.gov.cn/2016special/madeinchina2025/.
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pretty much as they wish. It also has economic costs since those tasked with executing the BRI 
can assume that ‘everything goes’ and pick and choose those projects or activities that suit 
them best, rather than those that correspond to well-defined development priorities.
Geographic scope
If the BRI’s objectives are not clearly communicated and understood, its geographic priorities 
are even less so. Intended to replicate the “Silk Road” in Xi Jinping’s original formulation, 
in the 2015 white paper the BRI is described as covering, but not “limited to, the area of the 
ancient Silk Road. It is open to all countries, and international and regional organisations for 
engagement, so that the results of the concerted efforts will benefit wider areas” (NDRC, 2015). 
In one analysis, the BRI is intended to link China with some 65 other countries that account 
collectively for over 30 percent of global GDP, 62 percent of population, and 75 percent of 
known energy reserves (World Bank, 2018c). More recent estimates put the number of coun-
tries that are part of the BRI in triple digits. 
Even the largest development programmes are normally directed at specific regions, or 
at countries belonging to a well-defined group (eg the Least-Developed Countries). These 
programmes also provide some sense of country priorities within them. Not so the BRI. For 
example, Hillman (2018) identifies the six main geographic channels most often mentioned 
as constituting the BRI, and the countries most often mentioned as part of each channel. He 
finds that except for Pakistan – a BRI poster programme – Chinese projects are just as likely to 
be found outside this group of countries as within it.
Corridors
It is difficult to identify a shared agenda among BRI countries, even within the same geo-
graphic corridor. Clearly the needs of poor nations such as Pakistan, Myanmar and several in 
Central Asia and East Africa, are very different than those of EU members such as the Czech 
Republic, Portugal and Greece, which the BRI supposedly aims to reach. Countries within 
the same corridor have world-class infrastructure; in others infrastructure is inadequate. In 
the same corridor there are countries with good and bad logistics, liberal and restrictive trade 
policies, and strong and weak business climates (Figure 1). No guide is available from the BRI 
on how interventions across such a diverse group will be identified and prioritised.
Figure 1: Countries within same economic corridor show significant differences in 
terms of logistics performance, trade policy and business environment
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank (2018d) and WTO et al (2018). Note: Bars show the range of scores attained by countries within 
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State-owned enterprises
China’s state-owned enterprises play a major role in the BRI. These firms certainly display 
genuine advantages, such as low costs and well-honed skills in their areas of specialisation, 
but they also often benefit from subsidised financing, soft budget constraints, monopoly or 
oligopoly positions at home, privileged supplier and customer relationships, an implicit or 
explicit state guarantee and various forms of other non-transparent subsidies. These SOEs will 
also tend to favour Chinese suppliers19. 
Here is yet another indication that China’s state capitalism and its one-party political 
system sit uneasily in a liberal-democratic world order. The US Congress agrees on little 
nowadays, but there is consensus across the political spectrum that Chinese policies have to 
change and that if they do not ‘something has to be done about China’. This view is shared to a 
greater or lesser degree by the US’s major allies20.
These criticisms of China are well-grounded as they relate to the internationally most 
competitive products, such as steel, aluminium, solar panels, semiconductors and the already 
mentioned high-tech sector. But it is unclear whether this argument also extends to the kind 
of infrastructure projects being realised under the BRI. If Chinese firms withdrew from the 
infrastructure sector in developing economies, would others take their place? A dataset21 of 
World Bank infrastructure projects open to internationally competitive bidding suggests that 
over the last decade, Chinese firms have superseded western firms and gained a dominant 
share in construction, provision of capital equipment, and project design and engineer-
ing. In 2007, 5.5 percent of funds for World Bank projects outside of China were awarded to 
Chinese companies; in 2017 this share stood at 36 percent of total procured project costs 
outside China. Chinese firms now mostly face competition from developing countries such 
as Turkey. As mentioned previously, few private-sector investors are eager to underwrite the 
risky long-term infrastructure projects that Chinese SOEs are eagerly taking on. Perhaps this 
is the reason why, while many policymakers and politicians are vocal about the distortions 
associated with the BRI, the private sector is quite silent. 
Allocation of resources
The BRI is also often criticised inside China. The main objection is that it is a waste of 
resources in a country that is still relatively poor and requires more investment in its own 
backward regions. Estimates by Dreher et al (2017) suggest that total official finance given 
by the Chinese government could amount to $350 billion between 2000 and 2014, equal to 
approximately 0.5 percent of GDP generated in that period in China. This is a significant sum 
for a developing country and compares favourably with the $360 billion of official develop-
ment aid (ODA) and official development finance that was spent in the same period by the 
United States government. However, most of China’s estimated $350 billion outlay consists of 
export credits and loans extended at market rates. Counting only official finance granted on 
19 Ghossein et al (2018) collected data on how Chinese-financed BRI projects select the firms that execute them. The 
authors find that very little information is available as most state-owned Chinese lenders do not disclose their 
lending activities: “The limited available data however indicate that Chinese companies account for the majority of 
BRI-procurement, even in light of their high share of total infrastructure projects in developing countries” (Ghossein 
et al, 2018).
20 This consensus has resulted in at least two concrete steps. First, the EU and the EU have separately brought WTO 
cases against China, challenging its status as a market economy. And, in 2018, the EU, Japan and the US joined 
forces to change the rules of the WTO to combat hidden subsidies and intellectual property theft, a thinly veiled 
attempt to target China specifically. On 12 November 2018, the EU, Japan and the US submitted proposals to the 
WTO’s Council on Trade in Goods that propose stricter rules for the disclosure of government subsidies and intro-
duce administrative sanctions against offending members. These proposals aim mainly at subsidies from Chinese 
government agencies or state-owned enterprises, which are alleged to lead to overcapacity and disadvantage 
non-Chinese companies. Furthermore, the EU, Japan and the US plan to increase protection of trade secrets, such 
as source codes, with instruments within and outside the WTO.
21 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/brief/summary-and-de-
tailed-borrower-procurement-reports.
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ODA-like terms, Dreher et al (2017) estimate Chinese foreign aid between 2000 and 2014 to 
amount to at least $75 billion, an amount similar to ODA disbursements from the Netherlands 
in the same period (OECD, 2018). Thus, China’s ODA may amount to only 0.1 percent of GDP 
between 2000 and 201422. 
Transparency
Lack of transparency is perhaps the defining trait of the BRI and the projects carried out un-
der its umbrella. For example, the BRI is undoubtedly a very large programme, but how large? 
The amount China has committed under the BRI is unknown and the additional amount 
envisaged is vague. Numbers mentioned, which may include projects launched before the 
BRI, range from $1 trillion over an unspecified period to $8 trillion over 20 years (Hurley et al, 
2018). But the formal pledges made up to 2014 to the Silk Road Fund, managed by the Central 
Bank of China, stood at just $40 billion.
The discrepancy in these numbers reflects the fact that China’s finance comes principally 
on commercial terms from its state-owned infrastructure firms and development banks, the 
China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, and that the grant element 
in most loans is small or non-existent. These banks do not disclose their lending sums and 
precise terms are difficult to identify.
The situation is especially murky for those projects that are non-debt generating and take 
the form of BTO (Build, transfer and operate) arrangements, where the main obligation is to 
buy the product (eg electricity) at a predetermined price. Other projects are paid off in the 
form of natural resources according to agreed price formulas, and some are carried out in 
exchange for a share of ownership in the mine, port or facility in question. How the cost and 
risks of BRI projects are shared between China and partners and according to which criteria, 
are not specified. 
This lack of transparency in projects financed contrasts with the way in which develop-
ment finance is normally provided through multilateral channels and most bilateral ones. The 
provision of aid and the clearance of a World Bank or, say, United Kingdom Department for 
International Development investment project is subject to a well-defined and transparent 
review process. In contrast, deals struck under the BRI and involving Chinese commercial 
banks are not23. Even the BRI MoU between China and its partners is typically not publicly 
available. The involvement of China-supported multilateral banks could provide a remedy, 
but their participation remains marginal at this stage. 
Due diligence
Another criticism levelled at the BRI is that some projects, such as a $12 billion refinery in 
Ecuador24 or a $4 billion railway line between Addis Ababa and Djibouti25 have been discon-
tinued or seen enormous financial losses. To be sure, as the long and difficult experience of 
the World Bank shows, this is not the first time infrastructure projects in a difficult developing 
country context have run into trouble. Most recently, the World Bank had to cancel a $265 
million road project in Uganda26. However, there is a widespread view, which is also often 
shared by Chinese observers, that not enough due diligence is present in BRI projects. The 
22 In 2016, China reported granting 0.36 percent of its GDP as ODA to the OECD Development Assistance Committee, 
while the United States reported granting 0.15 percent of its GDP.
23 According to Hurley et al (2018), “for multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the AIIB [Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank], the financing terms for loans to sovereign governments are publicly available. This 
practice is also followed by most bilateral development finance institutions. However, CDB [China Development 
Bank] and China Exim Bank do not disclose the terms of their loans, making it difficult, if not impossible, to accu-
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ability of the client to repay, either because of risks inherent in the project, or because of 
macroeconomic and fiscal constraints, stands out as an issue to which Chinese operators are 
not paying enough attention. 
The possibility that over-eager lenders can push unwary borrowers into bankruptcy or 
default is not new and not limited to China – as shown by the collapse of banks and compa-
nies during the Asian financial crisis, the sub-prime crisis in the United States, the euro-area 
sovereign debt crisis and the large official lending to poor countries that eventually had to be 
forgiven (with conditions) under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Paris 
Club. Nor is the build-up of unsustainable sovereign debt usually associated with a single 
project. World Bank (2019), which analyses the rising indebtedness of low-income countries, 
shows that the phenomenon is overwhelmingly the result of increased current spending, 
not investment in infrastructure. Still, the fact remains that some BRI projects are very large 
compared to the size of the economies of the countries where they are implemented, as in the 
case of Laos and Montenegro, and that, moreover, projects tend to come in bunches (port, 
airport, road, all to develop the same region), which can make the overall package too large 
for the recipient’s GDP.
There are well-known examples of Chinese lending proving unsustainable. An interna-
tional airport and a deep-sea port near Hambantota in Sri Lanka, financed largely with loans 
from the Export-Import Bank of China, have been running large losses since completion. To 
escape mounting debt, the maritime port has since been leased for 99 years to China27 and 
the airport will be operated by the Indian Airports Authorities28. Recently, the government 
of Pakistan ran into a current account crisis on the back of large BRI infrastructure projects 
that increased public debt and worsened the balance of trade. Now, the country is seeking 
financial assistance from the IMF29. Related worries arise over the financial sustainability 
of the China-Laos railway line as the project cost, $6 billion, is equivalent to half of Laos’s 
yearly GDP30. Several of the countries interested in the BRI have low credit ratings, high debt 
and weak governance, and appear set to borrow new large amounts from China. Hurley et 
al (2018) identified eight countries where high debt levels, low credit ratings and high likely 
borrowing under the BRI cause concern: Djibouti, the Maldives, Laos, Montenegro, Mon-
golia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. Most of these countries have borrowed from the 
Export-Import Bank of China for very large infrastructure projects, the costs of which amount 
to double digit percentages of the countries’ GDPs.
Policy implications
China’s efforts to forge stronger links with its neighbours and more widely with its trading 
partners around the world are legitimate, so long, of course, as the underlying intent remains 
peaceful. The same can be said of any other country. The focus on infrastructure is welcome 
and needed. Enhancing bilateral trade by building transport infrastructure and concluding 
trade agreements will ultimately have the effect of stimulating global trade as well. The infra-
structure investments under the BRI could reduce global trade costs by between 1.1 percent 
and 2.2 percent (de Soyres et al, 2018), even without accounting for efforts to improve the 
operation of customs and reducing other forms of barriers to trade.
Two facts are clear. First, China, the world’s most populous nation, is not ready for a 
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ularly for it, and of which the BRI is in some sense an offshoot. Second, China is fully commit-
ted to the BRI and, one way or the other, it is going to continue along that path. 
But the BRI, to be effective, needs to meet the basic conditions of a trade and development 
strategy, which are clear objectives, adequate resources, selectivity, a workable implemen-
tation plan, due diligence and clear communication. The established donors are right to be 
concerned that some of these conditions are not met, especially regarding issues related to 
due diligence and, more specifically, fiscal sustainability. 
Detailed proposals for revamping the BRI are beyond our scope. But it is obvious that the 
BRI needs a better articulated, coordinated and more transparent plan that identifies objec-
tives by corridor and by country and in each case specifies modalities. Clear communication 
is important given China’s size and the challenge of coordinating such a broad endeavour 
within and outside of China. In a politically-charged environment, a failure to clearly define 
the BRI risks inflaming and empowering the opposition. Most importantly, China must do a 
better job of evaluating the risks and costs of projects. Chinese firms and banks have plenty of 
bad domestic loans to worry about; they do not need a set of international debt crises to deal 
with as well.  
The BRI is and should remain primarily a Chinese initiative to retain its advantages in 
terms of access to financial resources, speed and execution. However, a more systematic effort 
to collaborate with multilateral institutions and learn from accepted standards where it is 
possible to do so – such as is envisaged in the MoU signed in 2017 with the multilateral devel-
opment banks, could help overcome some of the BRI’s shortcomings. A more transparent 
approach is likely to help Chinese and international firms to decide where their investments 
should go. And, if China envisages a BRI that will require several trillion US dollars of invest-
ment, it would surely benefit from leveraging its own efforts using other funds from bilateral 
and multilateral donors, and from the international private sector. 
For many developing countries and even for some relatively wealthy nations such as 
Australia, New Zealand and EU members to the south and east, the BRI could represent a 
significant commercial and infrastructure investment opportunity and should be viewed as 
such. But, considering the preceding discussion, these nations should take special care in 
evaluating the projects and the commercial conditions attached to them. They should not rely 
on their Chinese counterparts for ad-hoc project proposals, and should instead develop their 
own infrastructure strategies based on a benefit-cost analysis of the main projects, yielding 
clear priorities. Obviously, money must be repaid, and the ability to pay for a large project 
must be evaluated based on the overall national fiscal condition, not just on the project’s 
intrinsic profitability.
The Great Powers that vie with China for influence and for markets would be well advised 
to adopt a constructive stance toward the BRI. While insisting that China reforms its initia-
tive along the lines of greater transparency, improved due diligence and safeguards, the EU 
and US should also acknowledge that there are very important areas of synergy between 
their own efforts and those of China. The BRI is consistent with their development efforts. It 
should be easy to see that infrastructure investment in Africa and expanded African trade can 
also improve the EU’s commercial and investment prospects, and might even be in Europe’s 
security interest writ large. The EU also has an interest in a Eurasian land bridge, which could 
provide a non-trivial boost to Europe-Asia trade (García-Herrero and Xu, 2016). The EU has 
also responded by highlighting its own connectivity initiatives linking the EU and Asia, which 
remain very modest in scope in comparison to the BRI31. Similarly, Latin America, in whose 
prospects and stability the United States has a vital economic and security interest, could 
benefit greatly from the BRI.  
A notable effect of the BRI is to pose a challenge to the established donors to increase and 
accelerate their provision of infrastructure in developing countries and even within their own 
borders. Insofar as the BRI represents increased competition for stodgy development banks in 
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31 See https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/central-asia/52916/connecting-europe-asia-eu-strategy_en.
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infrastructure provision, that is all to the good. The Compact with Africa (CwA), a G20 initia-
tive that began under the 2016-2017 German G20 presidency, is intended to stimulate invest-
ment in African infrastructure by improving macroeconomic management, strengthening the 
business environment and attracting private sector interest. About a dozen African nations 
have joined the Compact and initiated a wide range of reforms. The CwA is an example of the 
kind of response that is needed, though one that remains untested for lack of enough private 
sector response to date.
References
Asian Development Bank (2017) Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs, Asian Development Bank
De Soyres, F. , A. Mulabdic, S. Murray, N. Rocha Gaffurri and M. Ruta (2018) ‘How Much Will the Belt 
and Road Initiative Reduce Trade Costs?’ Policy Research Working Paper 8614, World Bank Group, 
available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/592771539630482582/How-Much-Will-
the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Reduce-Trade-Costs
Dreher, A., A. Fuchs, B. Parks, A.M. Strange and M.J. Tierney (2017) ‘Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence 
from a New Global Development Finance Dataset’, Working Paper 46, AidData, available at https://
www.aiddata.org/publications/aid-china-and-growth-evidence-from-a-new-global-development-
finance-dataset
García-Herrero, A. and J. Xu (2016) ‘China’s Belt and Road initiative: can Europe expect trade gains?’ 
Working Paper 5/2016, Bruegel
Ghossein, T., B. Hoekman and A. Shingal (2018) ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, MTI Global Practice Discussion 
Paper 10, World Bank Group
Global Infrastructure Hub (2017) Global Infrastructure Outlook, available at https://outlook.gihub.org/
Hillman, J. E. (2018) ‘China’s Belt and Roller Coaster’, Commentary, 14 September, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-roller-coaster
Hurley, J., S. Morris and G. Portelance (2018) ‘Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road 
Initiative from a Policy Perspective’, CGD Policy Paper 121, Center for Global Development
IMF (2018) Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics (BOP/IIP), International 
Monetary Fund, available at http://data.imf.org/bop
Jayaram, K., O. Kassiri and I. Yuan Sun (2017) Dance of the lions and dragons: How are Africa and China 
engaging, and how will the partnership evolve? McKinsey & Company
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2018) National Data, available at http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/ 
NDRC (2015) ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime 
Silk Road’, News Release, 28 March, National Development and Reform Commission, available at 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html
OECD (2018) ‘Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows’, OECD International Development 
Statistics (database), available at https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en
UNCTAD (2018) World Investment Report 2018. Investment and new industrial policies, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development
Veugelers, R. (2018) ‘Are European firms falling behind in the global corporate research race?’ Policy 
Contribution 2018/6, Bruegel
World Bank (2017) Measuring and analyzing the impact of GVCs on economic development, World Bank 
Group, available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440081499424129960/Measuring-
and-analyzing-the-impact-of-GVCs-on-economic-development
World Bank (2018a) World Development Indicators, available at http://wdi.worldbank.org/
World Bank (2018b) Annual Report 2018, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank
World Bank (2018c) ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, Brief, 29 March, available at https://www.worldbank.org/
en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative 
World Bank (2018d) Doing Business 2018, The World Bank
World Bank (2019) Global Economic Prospect: Darkening Skies, International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development/The World Bank
WTO, ITC and UNCTAD (2018) World Tariff Profiles 2018, World Trade Organisation
Xi, J. (2013) ‘Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future’, speech 
at Nazarbayev University, Astana, 7 September, available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml
Yan, X. (2019) ‘The Age of Uneasy Peace’, Foreign Affairs 98(1), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/china/2018-12-11/age-uneasy-peace
